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Abstract
The Tokugawa Shogunate of the Edō Period in Japan was one that ruled for over
250 years, but dissolved rather quickly. There has been a significant research about this
topic that explains why the Tokugawa Shogunate collapsed. However, after compiling
several sources that examine the most instrumental cause of the dissolution of the
Shogunate, this thesis finds that the Tempo Crises were a significant factor in the
dissolution of the Tokugawa Shogunate. So why were the Tempō Crises the most
instrumental factors to the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate? When trying to understand
the failing of the Tokugawa government system, there are several factors that contribute
weight in the dissolution. Important causes include: hierarchical shifts within the class
system, the failure of isolationism and influence from outside nations, including the
Dutch and Americans, and unrest within different feudal domains. These causes are the
true collapse of the Shogunate, but a starting point at the Tempō Crises is what lit the fire
underneath a need for change, and emphasized the characteristics of the Shogunate that
were bound to fail.
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I.

Introduction
Japan is a country that has great influence internationally, boasting the creation of

cultural innovations like Nintendo and anime, to technological achievements like the
Bullet Train and international corporations, such as Toyota. The nation is often regarded
as one of the most highly developed and technologically advanced countries in the world,
and to add to that, highly democratic. Although Japan has succeeded in creating a fully
functioning society and political system, and has promoted progressive reform and
change, this was not always the case, with economic disparity, political failure, and food
shortages becoming more prevalent in the 1830s. In 1867, one of the most prominent and
powerful governing bodies in Japanese history fell, leading to the quick, but far from
seamless transition into an industrialized nation, namely the Meiji Restoration. This
governing body was the Edō Bakufu, and its dissolution would stamp an end to the 264year reign of what was also known as the Tokugawa Shogunate.
The eventual dissolution of the Tokugawa Shogunate is an event that can be
studied extensively from many perspectives; however, I choose to look through the lens
of a political scientist and historian. The history of why governments and nations fall
provides scholars with the ability to characterize modern day government as successful or
not, and to sort through the massive amounts of governments before modern day.
Studying failed governments and nations results in a conclusion among scholars on the
specific causes of the failure, and Edō Period Japan was no different in this sense. There
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has been an expansive amount of work done on the failure of the Tokugawa governing
bodies, with much of that work being centered around the many events leading up to the
Meiji Restoration. Many of these works argue that influences from the push to end
isolationism to social hierarchical shifts were the contributing factors to the failure of the
Tokugawa Bakufu, but 30 years prior to these factors were the Tempō Crises. I argue that
the Tempō Crises were the most instrumental aspect to the eventual dissolution of the
Shogunate. However, I do not simply cast aside the arguments from scholars that have
been made for decades, but instead argue that commonly argued factors would not in fact
be able to develop without the backlash from the Tempō Crises.
Following the Tempō Crises, the Tempō Reforms would devastate the future of
the Edō Period. Hoping to reestablish economic and social stability, the choices made
during this time period would weaken the state past no return, and give the common
people of Japan the reason and opportunity to change the entire course of the nation.
Through analyzing materials from this time period, from mortality records from The
Great Famine, to modern day analysis of how the Tokugawa Shogunate failed to provide
for their citizens, the argument that the Tempō Crises being the most important
contributing factor to the government dissolving is made.
Much of what occurred during the Tempō Crises, ranging from famine and
drought to mistreatment of the common Japanese people, paint a vivid picture of why
nations and states fail, as highlighted by Rotberg (2003). Comparing the Tempō Crises
and the reforms that followed to other failed nations provides a strong argument as to
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why the Tempō Crises were so important in the dissolution of the Tokugawa Shogunate.
In the following portions of this paper I will provide evidence from several sources to
make this argument.
To begin this study, I will provide necessary background to the situation that is
being discussed. This will be important to further understanding the state of the
Tokugawa government at the time of the Tempō Crises. Next, I will provide the
theoretical framework to delve deeper into the research that is being presented, and to
further my argument through other primary and secondary sources. Following the
intellectual framework of my research, and `through a historiographical review of other’s
work in this field and analyzing scholars George Wilson (1992), Adam Clulow (2014),
and Eijiro Hanjo (1934), I will provide evidence as to why the Tempō Crises were so
monumental in the downfall of the Tokugawa. Not only will I show the gap in the
literature provided, but also make the case as to why this argument is more conducive to a
coherent and clear understanding of the failure of the government, and why this argument
belongs in this field. Finally, comes the findings and analysis of this research, and the
conclusion to the argument being made. The final sections will provide the opportunity to
look at Japan after the Tokugawa fall, and the lasting impact that the Tempō Crises had
on the nation’s progress and its eventual development into its prominence today.

II. Background
Japan had finally been at peace for 250 years since the beginning of the Tokugawa
period in 1603, when it came crashing down at its peak in 1868. However, the issues that
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would eventually cause the destruction of the infamous “Golden Age” in Japanese history
started much earlier than 1868. Tumultuous times reigned over Japan, following civil war
after civil war to determine who would rule the divided nation, all the way until 1590.1
Tokugawa Ieyasu, the heir to the great ruler Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598), would
take control over the nation, and the Tokugawa Period of Japan would officially take
hold. Unfortunately, there is no nation that has a complete golden age, or dark age for that
matter, yet the following centuries would widely be considered as the most important to
the development of Japanese culture, religion, and nationhood. Lasting from 1638
onwards, until the time period being presented in this essay, there would be no armed
conflict of relevance, nor civil war, to disrupt the peace set in place by Hideyoshi.2
Seclusion policies that had been preached by Hideyoshi for so many years prior to
the Tempō Crises and would affect just about every aspect of life in Japan during the
Tokugawa Period, beginning in 1750.3 Already, the nation was beginning to see the need
for imports from outside the secluded islands, and Toshiaki Tamaki covers the topic
extensively, with a focus on the silver mines that had been present within the nation for
hundreds of years. By the late 1700s, Japan was beginning to experience the lack of trade
opportunities that came with seclusion, especially from the Western world.4 Silver had

David Howell, “Japan in Tokugawa Period and Modernity,” Oxford Encyclopedia of the
Modern World (January 1, 2008): 2, Accessed October 15, 2021.
1

2

Ibid.

Toshiaki Tamaki, “Japanese Economic Growth during the Edo Period,” Modern and
Contemporary Mediterranean Center.
3

4

Ibid.
!4

lost its value, as inflation was continually growing, and could not keep up with the fact
that many of the mines had begun to “run dry.” This would turn to the eventual need to
change trading systems within the islands, as much of the common people could not use
their money to afford daily necessities, nor would it support a business without influence
from those outside the system. Sakoku, the term coined to describe Japan’s isolationism
during the Tokugawa Period, rang loudly as the times continued to bear down on the
people of Japan, and as the rest of the world looked from afar, waiting for their
opportunity to insert themselves into the curious and mysterious islands of Japan. 5
Much of the Tempō Crises were victims of the rice culture that had been produced
in Japan for centuries prior to the events. Understanding rice culture is important for
understanding why the famines, mortality, and government intervention were so key to
the eventual dissolution of the Tokugawa government. Rice has often been seen as a deity
itself in Japan, existing as far back as the first texts produced from the islands in the 8th
century.6 These deities were the same that gave life and nourishment to the people of
Japan, and had been providing for them since the birth of the islands. In the case of Japan,
worshiping these deities resulted in long and healthy lives, however, unlike other
religious cultures, these deities could not be necessarily embodied by humans.7
Therefore, the humans eat the rice to show their appreciation to their higher powers. This

Tashiro Kazui, and Susan Downing Videen, “Foreign Relations during the Edo Period:
Sakoku Reexamined,” Journal of Japanese Studies 8, no. 2 (1982): 284.
5

6
7

Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, “Japanese Identities Through Time,” Rice as Self (1994): 2.
Ibid.
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was the first instance of rice culture in Japan, and it would last for millennia following
these beginning stages. Evolving gradually, rice culture would later be seen as a cycle
that embodies human life, from growth to reseeding.
Rice culture would eventually deviate from a simple connection to deities, to
evolve into a more practical influence. Because of Japan’s natural environment, and its
ability to grow rice at high rates, there were plenty of rice paddies and farmers to provide
for the nation. However, rice became a much more important aspect of society in Japan,
as it would soon be considered a commodity for payment in monetary forms. Taxation on
rice “bales” would increase, and more specifically from the pockets of the Samurai
during this time period.8 At the time, Samurai were seen as protectorates, the educated,
and the influential in the social, economic, and political landscapes of Tokugawa Japan.
Their rise to power had begun years before, in 1600, when the position of Samurai would
get you just about anywhere in your life. From government appointments, to teachers and
warriors, the culture surrounding Samurai gave them a likeness to celebrities in today’s
world.9 Payment towards these Samurai was given in rice bales, and substituted their
silver stipend in the years to come. There was a stark increase in payments in the late
1700s that would put many Samurai in debt to farmers and peasants, a fact that many
would come to regret in the coming decades.10

Kozo Yamamura, “The Increasing Poverty of the Samurai in Tokugawa Japan,
1600-1868,” The Journal of Economic History 31, no. 2 (1971): 379.
8

9

Ibid.
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With the Tokugawa Shogunate continuing to push the Sokaku principles, and
refusing to change the ways of Japan, there was extreme buildup in the forms of revolts
against local governments. There were 1,78711 revolts since 1603, to be exact, with over
400 related to taxation laws and rice–famines, death, and eventually, the Tempō Crises
and Reforms. With the state of the Tokugawa Shogunate shaking, and the governing body
refusing to acknowledge the growing issues at hand, there was an extreme amount at
stake, and the surface tension would eventually break at the tiniest drop being added to
the mix. With the knowledge of the state of the Tokugawa Shogunate coming into the
19th century, I will now explore my argument in more detail.

III. Historiography
The Tokugawa Shogunate, in the Edō Period of Japan, ruled the majority of the
islands from 1603 to 1868, when the government dissolved because of several different
influences. Many authors and scholars attribute this dissolution to the different internal
and external struggles, including Dutch and American influence, rearrangement of the
class system, and the increase of feudal disagreements. I, however, argue differently. I do
not disagree with many of said scholarly sources, such as George M. Wilson and Adam
Clulow, but I do argue that the Tempō Crises—a series of events that were disastrous for
the long term survival of Tokugawa Japan—were the most influential and instrumental to
the eventual dissolution of the Shogunate. The many issues that would occur later, such

Abbey Steele, Christopher Paik, and Seiki Tanaka, “Constraining the Samurai:
Rebellion and Taxation in Early Modern Japan,” Harvard University International
Studies Quarterly, 2017.
11
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as the ones mentioned prior to this, would not have been either possible, or nearly as
harmful to the governing body if not for the effects of the Tempō Crises.
In this historiographical essay, I critically analyze three sources that I argue are
important to understanding Japanese history, and more specifically during the late Edō
Period. The sources selected for this historiography are The Company and the Shogun,
written by Adam Clulow, and Patriots and Redeemers in Japan, written by George M.
Wilson, plus The Last Fifteen Years of the Tokugawa Shōgunate, an article written by
Eijiro Hanjo. All of these texts, with the first two being published books, are important to
the understanding of the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate, yet they touch on different
aspects respectively. Although written in different time periods, ranging from 1934, to
2016, the authors fail to specifically acknowledge the Tempō Crises as a significant
aspect of the fall of Tokugawa Shogunate. My goal is to connect these different aspects,
and to explain how the differences make for a broader understanding of my thesis, and
how each source gives us insight into how the Tempō Crises opened the door to the
opportunity for change: the Meiji Restoration.
The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan
Adam Clulow, an author that attended Niigata University in Japan to study
history, produced a book that highlights the different encounters of the Dutch East India
Company in Japan, dating all the way back to 1609, just 6 years after the start of the Edō
Period and Tokugawa rule. The most important argument that Clulow makes throughout
this historical piece, is that the Company’s influence and persistence to open up Japan to
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trade, had a long-lasting impact on the country itself. Because of the isolationist
principles that were present in Japan at the time (and for most of Tokugawa rule), the
Dutch were very limited in their interactions. The Dutch East India Company had
footholds around the world, but their interactions in Japan were very different. Clulow
covers much of this in his text and argues that the influence of the Company would lead
to the major shift in isolationist principles. Clulow states that foreign influence “…
initiated a process of forced socialization in which Japan was compelled to accommodate
itself to an existing political order that it possessed little power to change.”12 The
influence of the Dutch on trade and the eventual opening of the nation would culminate
in the mid 19th century, and Clulow makes a sound argument as to why the Dutch had
such a pivotal role in changing the outlook on foreign influence. The Tempō Crises were
important in forcing the Tokugawa government to realize the necessities of merchants
and peasants in the 1830s, and outside influence helped them do this.
Patriots and Redeemers in Japan: Motives in the Meiji Restoration
Perhaps the most important and influential writer in secondary Japanese history is
George Wilson, a professor in History and East Asian Languages and Cultures at Indiana
University. Wilson’s text is a prime example that highlights the different aspects of the
fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate, with a focus on three main contributing factors
throughout. The factors, specifically for Wilson, are “foreigners, bakufu and daimyo,

Adam Clulow, The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa
Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 21.
12
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imperial loyalist samurai, and ordinary people”. 13 The main argument that is being made
in this text is that much of Japan would benefit from a change in their long-standing
system, and because of this, the government was bound to fall. The motivation to make
that change came from both the daimyo and the commoners, and with the help of outside
influence, such as the same influence Clulow mentions, Tokugawa Japan blurred the lines
between time and tradition. Throughout 260 years, there had yet to be a change, but
because of the factors that Wilson argues, there is little to show why change occurred so
suddenly. I agree with the argument that Wilson makes, and that the Tokugawa Shogunate
dissolved because of the overall mistreatment of the common people, stemming from the
nationalist need to return all power to the emperor. This, of course, did not work, and
would lead to the downfall of the nation. The biggest gap in Wilson’s literature is that he
fails to recognize the beginning of the disparities and mistreatment of the common
people. Traceable from others sources, such as Kozo Yamamura’s “The Increasing
Poverty of the Samurai in Tokugawa Japan, 1600-1868,” the mistreatment of the common
people of Tokugawa Japan was an issue that started well before 1868 and the Meiji
Restoration, which Wilson focuses on. The Tempō Crises, and reforms post famine and
drought, encouraged disparity, and was the beginning of the end for the Tokugawa
government. Without the Tempō Crises, there would not be an argument for the
mistreatment of common people, like George Wilson argues, and there would be no
pinpointed starting point in the fall.

George M. Wilson, Patriots and Redeemers in Japan : Motives in the Meiji Restoration
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
13
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The Last Fifteen Years of the Tokugawa Shōgunate
Eijiro Hanjo was a Japanese economist who wrote during the early 20th century,
and describes, in detail, the issues that the Tokugawa Shogunate faced during the waning
years of power. As the two authors stated before, Wilson and Clulow, Hanjo bases much
of his argument for the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate towards the end of the
1860s, and states that economic disparity and foreign influence held the most power in
affecting the governing bodies. Hanjo stated, in 1934, that “the last fifteen years of the
Tokugawa Shogunate represent the period in which the Shogunate experienced the
greatest unrest and underwent the most profound changes in its history.”14 This great
unrest and profound change revolved primarily around the instigation by Commodore
Matthew Perry and the United States Navy, but also the influence from other competing
countries in the trade with Japan. Not only did outside influence play a large role, but the
response by the daimyo and governing bodies to the instigation would push the public
away from supporting their decisions. The influence by Western nations would push the
public to believe that integration would result in a successful rebound from the fifteen
years prior to the fall, as famine, death, and government mishaps were still prevalent in
the country at the time. However, yet again, Honjo fails to acknowledge the fact that
Japan’s issues inside their own country had begun many decades before influence from
Western nations. Lack of food, trade of materials with outside nations, and depleting
natural resources had been a longstanding issue, as the nation continued to grow, but only

Eijiro Honjo, “The Last Fifteen Years of the Tokugawa Shōgunate,” Kyoto University
Economic Review 9, no. 2 (18) (1934): 1.
14
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relied on itself. Though much of Japan was broken up into different sub-governments,
there was still a need for central agreement on trade and resources. Pleading for open
trade with those outside the nation would not have been possible without the need for
resources down to the most basic necessities, such as food, hence the terrible famines
plaguing the rice fields. Hanjo makes the case that the Tokugawa Shogunate would not
have collapsed without the impact of Western influence, yet the failure to address why
that Western influence was needed is the reason that his work must be reevaluated. As
stated before, the Tempō Crises would open the door for following issues to arise on the
basis that the nation needed resources, because they had failed to sustain themselves.

IV. Intellectual Framework: Failed Nations
As covered in prior sections, the topic of the dissolving Tokugawa Shogunate is a
widely covered, yet minimally contested topic. With much of the literature focused
around specific causes during the final years leading up to 1868 and the official
dissolution, political scientists and historians have left the door cracked for different
approaches to the failure of the government. The factors that surround the collapse of a
government can be compared between different failed governments throughout history,
and looking at these different factors provides ample evidence as to why certain states
collapse. With comparisons to other nations, this section delves deeper into why the
argument can be made that the Tokugawa Shogunate was destined for failure long before
the common understandings of what transpired.
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Robert I. Rotberg is a historian, political scientist, and professor who was a
founding member of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Program on Intrastate Conflict. He
was also president of the World Peace Foundation. His work describes the necessities for
a functioning nation and government, and provides several examples as to why nations
fail, ranging from Nepal to The Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rotberg focuses on
more modern-day government failures. Rotberg argues that “There is no failed state
without disharmonies between communities”15, a quote that can be directly applied to the
failure of the Tokugawa government and the Shogunate. This study of failed nations is
very important for understanding the dissolution of Edō Japan, and as political scientists
and historians, studying trends and significant similarities between failed nations can help
provide that understanding.“In most failed states, regimes prey on their own constituents.
Driven by ethnic or other inter-communal hostility, or by the governing elite’s
insecurities, they victimize their own citizens or some subset of the whole that is regarded
as hostile.”16 Rotberg uses this quote to help explain the significance of government
mistreatment to the wellbeing of the nation, something that can be seen profusely in the
end of the Tokugawa Period. During the Tempō Crises, and applying this same thought
process as stated above, the significance of government mistreatment towards its
commoners would fuel the fight for change, and would provide the roadmap to changing
the system that had been in place for centuries. Understanding the similarities between

Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and
Indicators,” (Brookings. The Brookings Institution, July 2003), 5
15

16

Ibid.
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different failed governments provides the opportunity to demonstrate why the fall of the
Tokugawa Shogunate began with the failures during the Tempō Crises.
There are several aspects that can be taken from Rotberg’s piece, but involving
more perspectives from different case studies, better the understanding of what a failed
state can be defined as. Jonathan Di John, a scholar and professor at the University of
London, has done extensive research on the topic of failed states, with his expertise being
centered around Africa and Central America. Di John has done work within the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP), and has sat at the forefront of promoting
economic growth in unstable nations. He outlines the aspects that result in failing nations,
and uses“Coalitional Analysis,” a term coined by Di John to describe faction power:
“Coalitional analysis will enable us to overcome the limitations of purely
structural and actor-based explanations of breakdown and collapse. Structural
arguments examine the conditions most conducive to state collapse, but do not
explain how and why a particular country’s state breaks down. Agency-based
arguments emphasize the role a leader’s policies play in contributing to statebuilding or collapse but do not explain why such policies endure.”17
The distinction between coalition-based nation failure and structural failure is key to Di
John’s argument. Structural failure can be tied directly to the governing body of the
nation, while much of coalitional power is tied to those being governed. Coalitional
movement itself is an idea that groups of like minded individuals form groups to reach a

Jonathan Di John, “The Concept, Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical
Review of the Literature and Agenda for Research with Specific Reference to SubSaharan Africa,” The European Journal of Development Research 22, no. 1 (May 2009):
36.
17
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certain goal, whether it be for political, social, or cultural movements.18 The study of
Coalitional Analysis benefits the researcher by providing information on whether or not
the nation at the time is able to provide a place for more than one coalition to exist at one
time, and what coalitions hold power.
There are two outlines that Di John presents that define a state as “failing,” the
first being “resource abundance, resource scarcity, state failure and violent political
conflict.”19 Di John describes this aspect of nation failure as one that revolves around the
resources that affect the nation both economically, and politically. In the case of many
Middle Eastern nations, oil has become the most valuable resource being extracted from
the ground. This resource extraction is important to the rise of those economies, as well
as the rise of political leaders based on their understanding of the necessity to use it. This
resource abundance results in the growth or decay of a nation, and impacts the
importance of the nation on a global scale as well. The second aspect that Di John
presents is “The Resource Curse,”20 or the availability of the government in determining
the impact that the economy has on those that are under the governance of the nation at
hand. In many cases, “The Resource Curse” results in improper distribution of wealth and
resources, and affects the ability for the government to properly regulate power and the

Jonathan Di John, “The Concept, Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical
Review of the Literature and Agenda for Research with Specific Reference to SubSaharan Africa,” The European Journal of Development Research 22, no. 1 (May 2009):
36.
18

19

Ibid.
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economy. Di John states that “...a state’s dependence on natural resources - measured as
the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP - has a significant influence on the
likelihood that a civil war will begin in the next five years.” 21 However, this idea does not
simply apply to export data, but internal results as well. In the case of Tokugawa Japan,
rice culture and the ability to sustain the country played a large role in the survival of the
Bakufu at the time, and when a shortage was inevitable during the Tempō Crises, the
political structure began to fail.
I argue that there are many cases that can see both the failure of the governing
body, and influence of those being governed, such as the United States of America.
During the downturn of British rule in North America, the government failed to provide
substantive assistance to the people of her nation, yet those being governed took it upon
themselves to make the change they wished to see. I argue that this was a failed nation,
even while being considered a colony of another. Taking into account the perspectives of
both Rotberg and Di John, I apply both arguments to an analysis of the Tokugawa
Shogunate.

V. Data Collection and Methodology
The methodology of studying a subject such as the collapse of the Tokugawa
Shogunate requires researchers to take into account different perspectives. Primary

Jonathan Di John, “The Concept, Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical
Review of the Literature and Agenda for Research with Specific Reference to SubSaharan Africa,” The European Journal of Development Research 22, no. 1 (May 2009):
36.
21
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sources and documents from the Tokugawa Period themselves will be used to analyze
social norms, political unrest and decision making, as well as qualitative and quantitative
data centered around the Tempō Crises. These primary sources ranged from mortality and
death records from local government offices that were hit hardest by the Tempō Crises, to
journal entries from sailors that traveled back and forth from the United States during the
later time period. Analyzing these primary sources, and those specifically from Perry
(1854), Heco (1985), Jannetta (1992, translation), and Kinoshita (1998, translation), I will
be able to better grasp both the political and social atmosphere of Tokugawa at the time,
as well as an understanding of the impact of the Tempō Crises.
When analyzing primary source documents and historically significant articles,
Thomas Andrews and Flannery Burke (2007) collaborated to help produce an outline that
provides a roadmap to better categorize history. This roadmap refers to the “Five Cs”22,
and more specifically: Change Over Time, Context, Causality, Contingency, and
Complexity. To begin, I argue that not all of these categorizations are directly applicable
to this case study of Tokugawa Japan. First, “Change Over Time” is used to better
understand how the public’s feelings towards the Shogunate changed, and how the
political atmosphere developed prior to, during, and after the Tempō Crises. Next,
“Context” plays an important role in the understanding of the Tempō Crises, as using
sources that best describe the standing of the nation at the time will result in a more
comprehensive argument. Without Context, the argument can be made that the fall of
Thomas Andrews, and Flannery Burke, “What Does It Mean to Think Historically?”
The Newsmagazine of the American Historical Association, American Historical
Association, February 1, 2007.
22
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Tokugawa Japan was caused by any factor during its existence. Finally, “Causality” is
used by historians to “...base their arguments upon the interpretation of partial primary
sources that frequently offer multiple explanations for a single event.”23 This is the basis
of my argument that the Tokugawa Shogunate’s dissolution was created by the impact of
the Tempō Crises, and interpreting the primary sources in the following section will insert
my argument into a changing environment on the topic. Taking into consideration these
three of the five “Cs” will be useful in formulating an argument that fits within the
literature of the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Andrews and Burke sum this up
perfectly: “The five C's do not encompass the universe of historical thinking, yet they do
provide a remarkably useful tool for helping students at practically any level learn how to
formulate and support arguments based on primary sources, as well as to understand and
challenge historical interpretations related in secondary sources.”24
When analyzing primary source documents and historically significant articles,
Thomas Andrews and Flannery Burke (2007) collaborated to help produce an outline that
provides a roadmap to better categorize history. This roadmap refers to the “Five Cs”25,
and more specifically: Change Over Time, Context, Causality, Contingency, and
Complexity. To begin, I argue that not all of these categorizations are directly applicable
to this case study of Tokugawa Japan. First, “Change Over Time” is used to better
Thomas Andrews, and Flannery Burke, “What Does It Mean to Think Historically?”
The Newsmagazine of the American Historical Association, American Historical
Association, February 1, 2007.
23

24

Ibid.

25

Ibid.
!18

understand how the public’s feelings towards the Shogunate changed, and how the
political atmosphere developed prior to, during, and after the Tempō Crises. Next,
“Context” plays an important role in the understanding of the Tempō Crises, as using
sources that best describe the standing of the nation at the time will result in a more
comprehensive argument. Without Context, the argument can be made that the fall of
Tokugawa Japan was caused by any factor during its existence. Finally, “Causality” is
used by historians to “...base their arguments upon the interpretation of partial primary
sources that frequently offer multiple explanations for a single event.”26 This is the basis
of my argument that the Tokugawa Shogunate’s dissolution was created by the impact of
the Tempō Crises, and interpreting the primary sources in the following section will insert
my argument into a changing environment on the topic. Taking into consideration these
three of the five “Cs” will be useful in formulating an argument that fits within the
literature of the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Andrews and Burke sum this up
perfectly: “The five C's do not encompass the universe of historical thinking, yet they do
provide a remarkably useful tool for helping students at practically any level learn how to
formulate and support arguments based on primary sources, as well as to understand and
challenge historical interpretations related in secondary sources.”27

Thomas Andrews, and Flannery Burke, “What Does It Mean to Think Historically?”
The Newsmagazine of the American Historical Association, American Historical
Association, February 1, 2007.
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VI. Findings and Primary Source Analysis
As stated in prior sections of this thesis, there are four primary sources that can be
evaluated to determine the soundness of the argument that the Tempō Crises were the
most instrumental factor in the dissolution of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Perry (1854),
Heco (1985), Jannetta (1992, translation), and Kinoshita (1998, translation) all provide
specific and relative perspectives on different times before, during, and after the Crises
themselves, and they can all be evaluated in relation to the conditions that lead to failed
states developed by Rotberg (2003) and Di John (2008). Using the primary sources
identified above, I applied four conditions outlined by Rotberg and DiJohn to determine
whether or not the Tempō Crises were truly the leading cause for the collapse of the
Tokugawa Shogunate.
The connection between Di John and Rotberg, while taking into consideration the
primary sources from the time period, will provide a stronger base to the argument that
the Tempō Crises were catastrophic in the longevity of the Tokugawa Shogunate.
However, the table provided cannot highlight all aspects of a failed nation, but to increase
validity of the comparison, I have selected differing opinions on the matter of what the
definition of basis of “failed or failing state” is argued upon.
In the following chart provided in the next selection–”Findings and Analysis”– I
will highlight the differences between the perspectives of Di John and Rotberg, pertaining
specifically to Japan during the 1830s and the Tempō Crises. To reiterate what was stated
!20

prior to this section, the conditions are as follows for Robert I. Rotberg. A failed nation
contains at least one of these conditions:
1. Internal violence.
2. The inability to control the country's borders, or regulate trade within those
borders.
3. Have to have been “contested bitterly by warring factions.”28
‑

4. Have “disharmonies within communities.” 29
‑

5. Have “regimes that prey on their constituents.” 30
‑

6. Strong and measurable political corruption.
Considering the aforementioned conditions, there are some similarities between Rotberg
and Di John, but the latter provides a different perspective on the matter. Di John states
that failed nations must contain at least one of the conditions below:
1. Lack of basic government security.
2. The inability to control the country's borders, or regulate trade within those
borders.
3. Creation of violent political conflict.

Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and
Indicators,” (Brookings. The Brookings Institution, July 2003), 5.
28
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4. “Dependent resource scarcity.”31
‑

5. “The Resource Curse.”32
‑

The crossover between conditions emphasizes the importance of those specific points,
such as political corruption and the inability to control borders. This will come into play
later in this thesis, and the following section will explore the different conditions
individually, and the primary sources that show the connection between Tokugawa and
other failed nation models.
Robert Rotberg provides several examples as to why nations fail, and his
examples can be directly related to Tokugawa Japan. Nations fail because they lack
awareness or the ability to provide for their citizens. Simply put: “...the road to nationstate failure is littered with serious mistakes of omission and commission. Even in the
modern states with inherited weaknesses, failure is not preordained. Poor, arbitrary,
absentminded creations predisposed to failure need not fail.”33 Japan, during the
Tokugawa Shogunate failed to provide for their citizens as well. During the Tempō
Crises, the Shogunate refused to provide aid for the common folk of the nation, and

Jonathan Di John, “The Concept, Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical
Review of the Literature and Agenda for Research with Specific Reference to SubSaharan Africa,” The European Journal of Development Research 22, no. 1 (2009): 11.
31
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Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and
Indicators,” (Brookings. The Brookings Institution, July 2003), 5.
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instead demanded that wages be lowered, for both the Samurai and lower classes.34 With
the harsh conditions of the Tempō Crises, the instability of the government began to
appear. The collapse of the Samurai class is widely considered one of the main causes of
the dissolution of the Tokugawa Bakufu, but this cause cannot be considered without the
inclusion of Tempō Crises. The unsatisfactory conditions of the government, and the
inability to act following famines, rebellions, and death, would not have appeared
obviously without the different aspects that occurred during the Tempō time period.
Failed nations have several different aspects in common, as stated before. I argue
that the Tokugawa Shogunate would not have been able to collapse at the time it did, nor
the way it did, without the prior issues revolving around the Tempō Crises. From the
famine and the collapse of local government in 1837, to the decline of the Samurai class
towards 1868, the domino effect remains ever present in the downfall of the Tokugawa
Shogunate. Without the Tempō Crises, a new nation would not have been able to be
rebuilt on the principles that would be discovered in the later years of the Bakufu.
Without the Tempō Crises, the internal factions of the government would not have grown
apart, the economic standing of those in power would not have failed, and the outside
influence from other nations would not have been accepted. The Tokugawa Shogunate
does not fail the way it does without the impact of the Tempō Crises on the longevity of
the nation.

William Wright Kelly, “Class, Community, and Party in 19th-Century Collective
Protest,” In Deference and Defiance in Nineteenth-Century Japan, 3–25, Princeton
University Press, 1985.
34
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Perry in Japan: A Visual History (1854)
Commodore Matthew Perry was the highest-ranking naval officer in the United
States military from 1809-1858, and his excursion and constant injection of American
offers into the Japanese borders were consistently rejected. However, in this transcription
of Perry’s journal detailing his journey to the island nation, he includes the
communication between United States President Millard Fillmore, and the Emperor of
Japan, and the negotiations that took place. In the letter from the President Fillmore,
Perry states:
“We know that the ancient laws of Your Imperial Majesty's government do
not allow of foreign trade except with the Dutch. But as the state of the
world changes, and new governments are formed, it seems to be wise from
time to time to make new laws. There was a time when the ancient laws of
Your Imperial Majesty's government were first made.”35
At the time of this interaction between the United States and Japan, there was necessity
for outside influence in trade, including the need for food and everyday resources. Perry
knew this, and knew that the trade at the time would benefit both the United States, and
Japan. The interaction between the Emperor and Perry shows that, because of the
necessity for trade and resources, the Tokugawa Shogunate would not be successful in
controlling their borders and remaining an isolationist country. This inability to navigate
the influence from the West would eventually lead to a collapse just a few decades later.
David L. Howell, a scholar on diplomacy in early 19th century Japan, argues that “...by
Matthew Calbraith Perry, “Perry in Japan: a Visual History,” Edited by Roger Pineau,
Perry in Japan, Brown University Library Center for Digital Scholarship, n.d. 1852.
Accessed November 21, 2021.
35
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the end of the decade [1850], Japan had entered into relations with all major powers and a
number of treaty ports had opened to trade.” 36 Since 1638, Japan had been successful in
limiting their trade to the West, and even Northeast Asia37 , yet the influence of the Tempō
Crises on the hungry, resource scarce, dying nation would give way for several
opportunities for negotiating and forcing one’s hand by Commodore Matthew Perry. Both
authors, Rotberg and Di John, provide the conditions of limiting borders, and list the
inability to defend and withstand negative outside influence as a condition that results in
a failed nation (See Table 1 and Table 2). The influence of the Tempō Crises on trade and
border control would eventually lead to the opening of the country, and for the world to
see that the Tokugawa Shogunate was failing.
The narrative of a Japanese; what he has seen and the people he has met in the course of
the last forty years (1895)
Joseph Heco, born in Japan in 1837, at the height of the Tempō Crises, wrote
extensively on his travels and his relations to the United States as a sailor, after he left the
country in 1850.38 Much of his journal, which is extensively specific, speaks on his early
experiences of the influence on public opinion, and the discourse within the community,
that the American fleet had during the need for trade. Not only this, but Heco also goes

David L. Howell, “Foreign Encounters and Informal Diplomacy in Early Modern
Japan,” The Journal of Japanese Studies 40, no. 2 (2014): 297.
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Tashiro Kazui, and Susan Downing Videen, “Foreign Relations during the Edo Period:
Sakoku Reexamined,” Journal of Japanese Studies 8, no. 2 (1982): 304.
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into depth about the repercussions that Japan continued to deal with post Tempō Crises,
much of which being political discourse and a need for change. In a quote, directed at the
governing officials in Heco’s hometown, he states: “Inasmuch as you have been dealing
largely with foreigners, and thereby brought misery to many of your countrymen and
utterly forgotten their true interest, and exhibited your indifference to those who are
suffering greatly from the present state of things; We, the Ro¯nin, intend to punish you as
we have already punished others in Yedo and elsewhere.”39 There are several instances of
these thoughts within Heco’s journal, much of which are aimed at public officials and
their failure to address the issues arising with the influence of the west, and the poverty,
hunger, and death that continuously arises throughout the nation. Considering Rotberg's
conditions, Heco provides evidence to the disparity between communities, the neglect of
citizen needs, and utter communal dissent (See Table 1). Public opinion of the Tokugawa
Shogunate and the state of the nation during and after the Tempō Crises was very clearly
at a low, yet there was nothing being done that resulted in a fixing of these problems.
Heco moves on to talk about the lack of basic security, and the inability of the Shogunate
to put down political violence, and instead chooses to fight the Western traders (See Table
2). On the other side, Heco writes about the disagreements within the communities as
well, as the government was beginning to bargain with Westerners post Tempō Crises, as
it was much needed, yet there were many in the communities that refused to accept it.
When two merchants were killed for dealing goods with Westerners, they had a left a

Heco, “The narrative of a Japanese; what he has seen and the people he has met
in the course of the last forty years,” [Tokyo, Maruzen, 1895] Pdf.
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note on the bodies that read as follows: “These unprincipled persons have been dealing
with foreign barbarians for their own gain, and have caused all goods to rise in price,
whereby the majority of the people are suffering. Their actions are also contrary to the
wishes of the Sovereign of the Empire, and therefore we have punished them as they
deserve.”40 The obvious and open communal discontent in the economic standings of
citizens in Tokugawa Japan, during and post Tempō Crises was growing, and there was
nothing being done by the government themselves to curb the disagreements.
Famine Mortality in Nineteenth-Century Japan: The Evidence from a Temple Death
Register (1992)
Early 19th century Japan saw a decline in population growth, according to Temple
Registers from the Shūmon Aratame Chō population records, which began with the
efforts to remove Christianity from the nation.41 In the years between 1801 and 1850,
there was, an extremely significant decrease in the number of births, and a loss of over
1.3 million people.42 Jannetta, in a translation of the Temple Registers attributes these
losses to the significant natural disasters during the Tempō Crises, such as drought,
monsoons, and the overall destruction of much of the rice fields in the nation.43 In the text
provided by Jannetta, a graph is shown that maps the death numbers of specific villages
Joseph Heco, “The narrative of a Japanese; what he has seen and the people he has met
in the course of the last forty years,” [Tokyo, Maruzen, 1895] Pdf.
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in the south of Japan, with one example being Ogen-ji. In the years between 1801 and
1830, the mean number of deaths caused by starvation in this specific village sat at
around 100 per year. 44 In the following years, and the beginning of the Tempō Crises, that
number jumped to an average of 400 deaths per year during the height of the famine.45
This increase of over four times was attributed specifically to extremely low yields of rice
production, and as stated earlier in this thesis, most villages relied very heavily on the
production of the crop. Not only did death numbers increase, but there was also a
significant increase of female distribution within different temples and villages
themselves.46 There was a much higher percentage of men starving to death during the
Tempō Crises because of a “biological reaction to lack of food.”47
The relation of the Temple Death Registers to the conditions of failed states
discussed by Rotberg and Di John fit within two different conditions, with the first being
“Neglect of Citizen Needs by Government” (See Table 1). The significant increase of
death rates, and the decrease of crop production was the result of poor management of
resources. In the cases provided, the government itself was at fault for the lack of
response to the low rice yields, and Jannetta herself claims that this was a key component
of the eventual collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate. She stated that “...the prevention of

Ann Bowman Jannetta, “Famine Mortality in Nineteenth-Century Japan: The Evidence
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was only one aspect of Japan’s transition to a modern demographic regime.” 48 This
“demographic regime” is in reference to the transition into the Meiji Period, and the
collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate, and the famine of the Tempō Crises sat at the helm
of transition. The other condition that this primary source helps to explain is the
“Resource Scarcity” (See Table 2). The failed response of the Tokugawa Shogunate to the
increased rates of starvation and famine resulted in a failure of the government to protect
its citizens.
Mortality Crises in the Tokugawa Period —A View from ‘Shūmon Aratame Chō’ in
Northeastern Japan. (1998)
Kinoshita provides similar evidence on the impact of the Tempō Crises as
Jannetta, yet focuses less on famine, and instead focuses on the impact war and epidemics
had on Tokugawa Japan. These findings were translated from the same Shūmon Aratame
Chō as Jannetta’s findings. This perspective gives a more comprehensive image of the
Tempō Crises outside of the famines and droughts, and Kinoshita’s findings show that in
much of the nation, the death rates of those older than 10 years increased significantly,
but the rates of those younger than 10 years actually decreased. 49 Kinoshita argues that
this can be attributed to several different factors, ranging from “food entitlement”50 to the
famines themselves, yet these factors play a much heavier role in crisis times. In a period
Ann Bowman Jannetta, “Famine Mortality in Nineteenth-Century Japan: The Evidence
from a Temple Death Register,” Population Studies 46, no. 3 (1992): 443.
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of time with a lack of food, it is beneficial to most families to feed their children before
they feed themselves, as to keep the family line alive. This could very well be the
evidence as to why there were significantly higher death rates among the ages between 10
years of age and 50 years of age.51
In the time of crises, whether it was famine, drought, or other natural disasters,
Kinoshita points towards government influence as an important aspect of response. Much
of this response can be seen within the differences in socio-economic standings during
crisis, and can be better summarized by Kinoshita as: “Analysis of the link between crisis
mortality and socio-economic status yields a puzzling result. In the non-crisis period,
socio-economic status played a minimal role in determining the survivorship of Yambe
villagers. In the crisis period, however, mortality differentials by socio-economic status
became more salient.”52 This primary source relates to three different conditions outlined
by Rotberg and DiJohn. First, the mortality rates during the Tempō Crises point directly
towards the “Communal Discontent” (See Table 1) and the fact that there was a severe
disparity between socio-economic responses and death rates. The higher the status of an
individual, the higher the survival rate, in the majority of cases. Those villages that were
hit harder by famine and drought suffered more, as would be expected, but less affected
villages saw a stark difference in death rates among the different classes.53 This resulted
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in the distrust of the higher classes, most of which ruled these villages and districts, and
led to the upheaval of the system as it was during the Meiji Restoration years later.
Second, this is yet another example of lack of response to citizen’s needs during the
crises. The Tokugawa Shogunate mistreated those of lower socio-economic classes, and
did not provide them with the goods to sustain their own lives. The mortality rates were
somewhat of a direct correlation to “Resource Scarcity” as discussed by DiJohn. Famine
plays a large role in the death rates during the Tempō Crises, and this condition is seen
again in this primary source.
The findings of this thesis are that Rotberg and Di John’s models would
categorize Tokugawa Japan during the Tempō Crises as a “failed nation”, based on their
conditions (See Table 1 and Table 2). With these findings provided, I argue that the
Tokugawa Shogunate had failed decades before the onset of the Meiji Restoration
because of the conditions set by Rotberg and Di John, such as internal violence, warring
factions, lack of basic security, the inability to control borders and territories, and overall
communal discontent. With the evidence provided by primary sources from Perry (1854),
Heco (1985), Jannetta (1992, translation), and Kinoshita (1998, translation), there is a
substantial argument to support this claim.

VII.Conclusion
The Tokugawa Period of Japan was widely regarded as the golden age of the
nation, and one that would subsequently last for over two and a half centuries. From the
beginning in 1603 and the following wars, and the official start of the great period in

!31

1638, the Tokugawa Shogunate ruled the nation effectively until its eventual collapse in
1868, ushering in the Meiji Restoration and the new era of Japan as a global power.
However, the Tokugawa Period began its downfall many decades earlier, and in 1833, the
ideas of change and alteration began to appear during the Tempō Crises.
The collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate is a widely discussed topic, and one that
is comparable to the writings on the cause for the American Revolution and creation of
the United States. Although this is an important and heavily agreed upon topic, I argue
that there is room for a different approach, and one that argues that the Tempō Crises
were the most instrumental factor in the collapse of this great period. Without them, the
world would not see the opening of the country to the West, and the eventual creation of a
government that focuses on the needs of the nation, instead of relying on standards set
hundreds of years before. In most cases, the failure to recognize the Tempō Crises as a
significant aspect of the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate results in a perspective that
does not recognize the needs of the common people of a nation. From the impact of
outside nations on trade and the economics of Japan, to the famines and mortality
numbers within disparaged communities, to distrust of government, the Tokugawa
Shogunate failed to respond to the issues of the Tempō Crises. This failure would leave
the door open for the push for change, and 30 years later, the collapse of one of the
longest lasting dynasties in East Asian history.
Applying the conditions outlined by Robert I. Rotberg and Jonathan Di John in
their failed state models this thesis was able to demonstrate that, although these models
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did have differences in conditions, there was crossover that presented a somewhat
repetitive analysis. Using Andrews and Burke's (2007) guidelines for historical analysis,
specifically, "change over time," "causality," and "context" showed that the Tempo Crises
had an effect on the fall of Tokugawa Japan. The social, political, and economic
atmosphere of Tokugawa Japan shifted tremendously over a relatively short period of
time. Looking at the sources shown in the Analysis and Findings section of this thesis, the
constant shifting of said atmosphere that was showcased by Heco (1895) was a prime
example of the “Change Over Time.” The diary of Commodore Perry (1852) provided an
example of "causality." Perry described the influence the West had on Japan’s border
openings. This influence "caused" Japan to open its borders and this opening contributed
to the fall of the Tokugawa as Japan became more familiar with new ideas. Finally,
“Context” is very important for understanding events. The findings from Jannetta (1992)
and Kinoshita (1998), that showed how rampant death and famine were provided
evidence as to the overall status of the nation prior to it failing.
To improve upon the findings of this thesis, further research should be examined
through a more extensive failed nation model. To add to this, having more comprehensive
primary sources from the Tokugawa Period itself may be beneficial to a better
understanding of the time period, and the reasons behind the state failure. I recommend
that further research be conducted in this area of study, more specifically by those who
are able to translate and speak Japanese. This may result in a more important study, and a
better comparison to other failed nation models.
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Andrews and Burke (2007) and the three of the “Five Cs” that were used to
analyze historical methods was very important to understanding the topic of the Tempō
Crises as well. The social, political, and economic atmosphere of Tokugawa Japan shifted
tremendously over a relatively short period of time. Looking at the sources shown in the
Analysis and Findings section of this thesis, the constant shifting of said atmosphere was
showcased by Heco (1895) was a prime example of the “Change Over Time” analysis
method. Next, the diary of Commodore Perry (1852) provided an example of the issues
that arose and resulted in the “Causality” analysis of the Tempō Crises when he described
the influence of the West on Japan’s border openings. Finally, the “Context” analysis is
grounded in the writings of Jannetta (1992) and Kinoshita (1998), where death and
famine were rampant, these authors provided evidence as to the overall status of the
nation prior to it failing. These three analysis methods provided by Andrews and Burke,
albeit overarching and unspecific, provided a backbone to why I researched the sources
that I did.
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Table 1: Conditions of a Failed State (Rotberg 2003)
Tokugawa Japan:
During the Tempō Crises

Conditions
Internal Violence

✓

Warring Factions

✓

Disparity Between Communities

✓

Inability to Control Borders/Territories

✓

Neglect of Citizen Needs by Government

✓

Political Corruption
✓

Communal Discontent

Table 2: Conditions of a Failed State (Di John 2008)
Tokugawa Japan:
During the Tempō Crises

Conditions

Lack of Basic Security

✓

Inability to Control Borders/Territories

✓

Violent Political Conflict

✓

Resource Scarcity

✓

“The Resource Curse”: Overabundance
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